The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party^{*}

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Abstract

Using various measures — cadres, martyr soldiers, and guerrilla bases — as proxies for the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Sino-Japanese War, we find that it grew significantly more in counties occupied by the Japanese Army. We identify three channels behind the CCP's political ascendancy. First, the Communists took advantage of the militarily weaker "puppet troops". Second, they built more grassroots organizations in the occupied area to mobilize support. Last, support for the CCP was powered by a nationalist sentiment spurred by war suffering of various kinds. Additionally, war-induced nationalism is more evident in counties formerly occupied by the Japanese to this date.

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1 Introduction

"Precisely because of the Japanese Imperial Army, which had occupied a large part of China, making Chinese people nowhere to go; once they understood, they began taking up armstruggle, resulting in the establishment of many counter-Japanese military bases, thereby creating favorable conditions for the coming war of liberation. Japanese capitalist and warlords have done a good deed for us (the Communists), if ever we need to say thank you, I would like to say Thank you to the Japanese warlords." — Mao Zedong, 1961. Mao Zedong on Diplomacy (Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan), pp.460-461.

The twentieth century was, in the words of Hobsbawm (1994), "the age of extremes"; a century that saw the rise of extreme ideologies in the aftermath of wars, which in turn led to more wars.¹ Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany are notorious examples of warinspired extremism (Acemoglu et al., 2021; Fontana et al., 2019), while Nazi Germany's aggression during World War II gave rise to the largest communist movements in many Eastern European countries including Albania, Hungary, Greece, Yugoslavia, etc. (Brown, 2009; Hammond and Farrell, 1975; Hobsbawn, 1994; Pons, 2014). The subsequent rise of communism in China and Vietnam was also intimately associated with foreign invasion and, to some extent also efforts of anti-colonialism (Smith, 2014).

Precisely how the CCP — militarily the weakest of the three powers involved in the Sino-Japanese War (the other two were the Japanese and KMT armies) — rose to power at the end of it is an important question that remains causally unexamined, although several possible answers have been advanced to account for its initial emergence.² Conceptualizing Mao's appeal to the Chinese people of the singular importance of nationalism in the war against Japan in the 1930s, political scientist Chalmers Johnson (1962) explains that Mao was trying to awaken a peasantry by connecting their concern for survival to a collective national identity that previously was appreciated by numerous intellectuals-cum-patriots such as Sun Yat-sen but which failed to take root in Chinese soil. It was this "peasant nationalism" that Johnson (1962) saw as being pivotal to the political ascendancy of the

¹Hannah Arendt (1963) made a strikingly similar remark: "Wars and revolutions — as though events had only hurried up to fulfil Lenin's early prediction — have thus far determined the physiognomy of the twentieth century".

 $^{^{2}}$ Refer to Section 5 for further discussion of the various alternative explanations of the early rise of the CCP.

CCP.³ But precisely how the Chinese Communist Party rose to power on the wings of a nationalist ideology remains to this day the subject of plausible hypotheses.⁴ There is also the curious question that the growth of communism on Chinese soil faced several nontrivial obstacles.⁵

Our goal is therefore to examine the causal impact of the Japanese invasion on the rise of the CCP in wartime China using a spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD). After providing a brief background on the history of communism in China and Japanese invasion in 1937 (Section 2), we employ a boundary to differentiate the counties occupied by the Japanese Army (the Japanese Occupied Area) from those controlled by the KMT and estimate their respective effect on a number of markers that reflect the growing influence of the CCP in these areas (Section 3). We chose the 1940 boundary because virtually all the battles fought between 1938 and 1940 were between the Japanese and KMT armies. Moreover, the validity of this boundary is further strengthened by the fact that a segment of it was caused by the KMT's bombing of the Yellow River Dyke in its attempt to prevent the Japanese Army from moving southward, reassuring that the boundary was not affected by the activities of CCP before 1940. In addition, we also conducted a balance check to ensure that the boundary in question is orthogonal to a number of geographic and socioeconomic factors such as elevation, slope, distance to China's main rivers, average temperature, precipitation, agricultural suitability, and pre-war population density.

We report the baseline spatial RDD results in Section 4. Using the 200 kilometers bandwidth as an example, we find that the "treated" counties experienced a significant increase in communist influence as measured by: 1) *per capita* middle-to-upper rank CCP

³In the light of Mao's tongue-in-cheek remark thanking the Japanese, he must have been patently aware of the possible fact that the Japanese invasion had afforded him and the Chinese Communist Party an invaluable opportunity to attend to the need of the Chinese people for assistance of organization and protection.

⁴In a widely acclaimed book, Rush Doshi (2021) insightfully points out that the Chinese Communist Party has always been a nationalist party since the days of Mao. This is borne out by the fact that, in the last forty years, leaders of the Chinese Communist Party — from Deng to Xi — have persistently emphasized the need to "rejuvenate" the country from the history of a "century of humiliation" that began with the Opium War, where rejuvenation includes closing the gap with the West and, where feasible, reshaping the international world order (p.19).

⁵First, throughout the dynasties the Chinese had always favored private ownership. Second, neither can we attribute China's Communist revolution to rising class consciousness arising from nascent industrialization. Third, and perhaps most important, just three years before the Sino-Japanese War the CCP was nearly wiped out by the KMT in 1934, forcing it to flee from the revolutionary bases that they initially established in the southcentral province of Jiangxi, to travel to the west on extremely difficult terrain to Sichuan, and then retreating all the way to the barren land in the northwest, with barely a tenth of its members (around only 40,000) surviving the deadly "Long March" (see Figure A1 in Appendix A). A recent historical account aptly refers to this barren part of China as "accidental holy land" (Esherick, 2022).

cadres at the level of colonel and above (3.7%), 2) per capita CCP martyr soldiers (14.3%), and 3) the size of the guerrilla base (95.4)

To ensure that our baseline RDD results are robust, we conducted several checks. First, given that the Japanese would probably choose to occupy counties along railway and telegraph lines, we control for a county's proximity to these strategic counties and confirm the earlier results (Section 4.2.1). Second, to further verify that our identification strategy is not threatened by reverse causality caused by the activities of the CCP Army, we conducted a quasi-natural experiment based on the bombing of the Yellow River Dyke. As the larger-than-expected flood area that resulted from this shock event formed a section of the boundary, we employed a subsample of the counties near this particular section to check for robustness and confirmed that the results obtained thereby are similar to those of the baseline RDD estimates (Section 4.2.2). Third, to ensure that our estimates are not affected by the possible migration of villagers from the occupied area to the non-occupied area, we used a "donut-hole" approach by dropping those observations near the discontinuity threshold to confirm our DID estimates (Section 4.2.3). Fourth, we employed the same three dependent variable in the pre-war period of 1926-37 as a falsification test, and found that the results are not significant, further proving that our baseline results are not driven by any unobserved pre-war conditions (Section 4.2.4).

To ensure that the boundary of the occupied area does not pick up any persistent effects of the explanations proposed to account for the early (pre-war) rise of the CCP (e.g. "modernization theory", "class struggle", etc.), we examine them in Section 5, and confirm in a balance check that the counties on either side of the boundary exhibit no discontinuities in a gamut of variables employed as proxies for these explanations.

To account for the causal relationship between the Japanese invasion and the rise of the CCP, we propose and examine the plausible channels, of which there are three (Section 6). The first is a "power vacuum", which is premised on the historical fact that the Japanese Army was unable to garrison everywhere themselves in the occupied area after the defeated KMT Army lost the battles and fled. To prevent the Communists from taking over these unoccupied areas, the Japanese resorted to militarily less combative "puppet troops" made up of captive KMT soldiers and remnants of local warlords. The communists thus took advantage of this opportunity by focusing subsequent attacks on areas garrisoned by puppet troops. By decomposing the Japanese occupied area into those garrisoned by the Japanese

Army and those garrisoned by puppet troops, we find that, compared with the counties garrisoned by the Japanese Army, those garrisoned by puppet troops experienced a distinctly faster growth in middle-to-upper rank CCP cadres by 3.4%-4.3%, martyr soldiers by 3.1%-5.6%, and guerilla bases by 13.3%-18.2%, respectively (Section 6.1).

The second pertains to local party building after the Communists moved into areas of with a power vacuum. It has been observed that, as soon as the CCP established a foothold somewhere, for example by establishing a small party group or *dang xiaozu*, they would dispatch cadres to develop more formal party organizations and recruit members accordingly (Hofheinz Jr., 1969). Using party committees and various ranks of the party organization in a county as proxies for local party building, we do indeed find that the prospects of developing Party organizations and recruiting members were significantly higher inside the occupied area.

We propose nationalism as the third channel, which was induced by the war suffering that residents of the Japanese occupied area experienced. For ease of empirical operations, we decompose this channel into the dimensions of "struggle for survival" and "humiliation and hatred", which we estimate by employing the number of civilians killed by the Japanese and a dummy variable indicating whether a county had experienced massacres as proxies for the former,⁶ and the number of reported rape cases and a dummy variable indicating whether a county hosted a "comfort women" (*weian fu*, essentially sex slaves) center as proxies for the latter, respectively. Together, these war sufferings contributed to what Chalmers Johnson (1962) coined "peasant nationalism" — a collective sentiment that impelled the Chinese peasants to join the CCP and support their cause in countering the Japanese invasion (Section 6.2).⁷ Our analysis substantiates the claim that war suffering is indeed a significant channel, as civilians within the occupied area did suffer significantly more in all four measurable respects.

While certainly not intended to be a comprehensive analysis, we try to provide a short discussion of why it was the CCP and not the KMT that won the support of the Chinese people as the leading agent of national salvation (Section 7).

To further verify the claim that nationalism was the key impetus behind the growing influence of the CCP in wartime China, we examine whether there were long-term effects

⁶A massacre was defined as one with a minimum weekly casualty of 800.

⁷As Johnson (1962) observes, the alliance between the Communists and the peasantry was partly driven by the latter's hatred of the invaders, but "to a large extent it was purely a matter of survival" (p. 59). As a conceptual framework we combine the two separate but inter-related mechanisms.

in the Japanese occupied area that lasted until the present by using a number of measures as proxies for sentiments of nationalism and regime support in Section 8. Indeed, we do find nationalistic sentiments to be significantly stronger among residents living in these areas, as indicated by their support for the political slogan "Chinese Dream" championed by the paramount leader Xi Jinping, consumption behavior that reflects patriotism (using the consumption of Japanese imports and foods as proxies), and greater trust in the Chinese government. Section 9 concludes.

Our study contributes to a rapidly growing literature that provides a causal link between wars and the rise of extreme populist revolutions during the twentieth century (Acemoglu et al., 2022; Dell and Querubin, 2018; Ferwerda and Miller, 2014; Fontana et al., 2021; Kocher et al., 2018; Ochsner and Roesel, 2016). For instance, using the variation of casualties from WWI as a proxy for hardship and disillusionment caused by the war, Acemoglu et al. (2021) find that growing support for Fascists represented a systematic response to the threat of socialism or "Red Scare". Focusing on the post-WWII years, Fontana et al. (2021) similarly find that the Italian Civil War and Nazi occupation of Italy during 1943-45 led to greater support for the Communist Party later. Suggestive evidence shows that longer exposure to the civil war and foreign occupation is likely to be a channel for this support, as it enhanced voters' support for the communist party because of its active involvement in resisting the Nazis. While this channel is seemingly similar to ours, an important nuanced difference is that the communist party in Italy was already a legitimate political party eligible for democratic election, whereas the rise of the Chinese Communist Party essentially represented a revolutionary or regime change. Clearly, our story also resembles Dell and Querubin (2018), who demonstrate how the foreign invasion in Vietnam (specifically the U.S. aerial bombing strategies) led to the unwanted consequences of communist insurgencies on the one hand, and a weakened local government and noncommunist civil society on the other hand (see also Kocher et al., 2011). In the historical context of China, we show how war suffering of various kinds inadvertently fueled an unprecedentedly strong nationalist sentiment and effectively served as the primary channel behind the disproportionate rise of the Chinese Communist Party under most difficult circumstances.

By exploiting the persistence effect of war-led nationalism, our work is also related to a large literature on the persistence of political attitudes and cultural traits. For instance, Acharya et al. (2016) show that differences in political attitudes between counties in southern United States can be traced back to the local prevalence of slavery in the 1860s. Similarly, Voigtländer and Voth (2012) found that anti-Semitism in Germany persisted strongly for more than five centuries, whereas Fouka and Voth (2021) found suggestive evidence for the cultural persistence of the Nazi occupation in Greece, where the sales of German cars during the recent Greek financial crisis fell significantly more in areas in which German troops had committed war crimes against civilians.⁸ In the Chinese context, using Shandong Province as a case study, Koss (2018) found that the CCP was able to enforce its policies more effectively in the Japanese occupied area such as the procurement of grain during the Great Leap Forward (c. 1958-61) and enforcement of the one-child policy in the postreform era. In addition to sharing concern about the long-term effects generated by the traumatic experiences of the Sino-Japanese War, importantly, our work connects the Chinese war experience to the historical rise of the CCP, which in turn became the source of mass support for the present regime.

2 Historical Background

2.1 A Brief Pre-war History of Communism in China

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1921 by Chen Duxiu and Li Dachao as a small reading group (with only 57 members) whose explicit aim was to spread Marxism among students and industrial workers. In 1924, the substantially larger Nationalist Party or *Kuomingtang* (KMT) — which had a membership of 50,000 — agreed to ally with the CCP (which still had less than 1,000 members) as part of the aid conditions stipulated by the Soviet Union. A year later came the unexpected death of the Nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen; his successor, the right-wing Chiang Kai-Shek, decided to cease cooperation with the CCP. With Chiang's victorious return from his conquest of the warlords in the *Northern Expedition*, he purged the CCP, whose membership now rapidly grew to 58,000, through hundreds of arrests and executions. Unable to counter the KMT, the CCP fled to the rural areas of Jiangxi Province in southcentral China and founded the "Red Army", together with some defecting KMT army units who were sympathetic to communism and eager peasants.

⁸Similar studies include Avdeenko and Siedler (2017), who document the intergenerational transmission of political extremism from fathers to sons; and Lupu and Peisakhin (2017), who find that the descendants of those who were affected by the deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944 were more hostile toward Russia and participated more actively in politics.

In spite of such adversity, CCP membership continued to grow to a staggering 411,000 by 1934 (the solid line in Figure 1), and established many revolutionary bases across southcentral China in the provinces of Jiangxi and Anhui (the pinkish red areas shown in Figure A1 in Appendix A). But the ideological clash between the two parties soon erupted into fully-fledged civil war (the First Civil War of 1927-37). In 1934, Chiang launched a full-scale attack on the CCP, forcing it to embark on the deadly "Long March", which essentially was a reluctant retreat from Jiangxi Province all the way to the north covering some 9,000 kilometers in over 370 days of brutal traveling, to settle eventually in northwest Shaanxi Province, with only a tenth of its 411,000 members surviving in 1937 (Esherick, 2022).

[Figure 1 about here]

2.2 Japanese Invasion in 1937

2.2.1 Power Vacuum, Grassroots Organizational Building and Growth of Guerrilla Bases

By 1937 Japan had already occupied Manchuria (now Northeast China) for six years. On July 7, on the pretext of a lost soldier near the Marco Polo Bridge (*Lugou Qiao*) in the southwest of Beiping (now Beijing), the Japanese Army invaded China Proper.⁹ For the next eight years, a full-blown war was fought primarily between Japan and the Nationalist Government. The KMT Army lost most of its battles with the Japanese and retreated southwestward. In many invaded villages, the civilians were killed, the local elite and KMT officials fled, with the Japanese Army taking over the abandoned villages as occupied areas between 1937 and 1940.¹⁰ But it did not last long. While it proved easy to break down the KMT army, it was not feasible for the Japanese to provide garrisons everywhere their troops conquered, let alone put in place an *ad hoc* government to provide day-to-day governance.¹¹ The result was what Johnson (1962) called a "power vacuum" (see also, Bianco, 1971; Goodman, 2013; Saich,

⁹Japan had long been preoccupied by its expansionist policy to secure raw materials, food and labor supplies from its Asian neighbors, especially China. Historians saw the incident as an alibi for Japan's further invasion of China.

¹⁰At the onset of the war in 1937 the Japanese forces single-mindedly pursued the KMT Army, forcing them to flee to the country's southwest. Instead of chasing them all the way there, the Japanese decided to consolidate the occupied areas on the North China Plain and took full control there (Kataoka, 1974, p. 5).

¹¹As Johnson (1962) points out, the Japanese Army was "finding it difficult elsewhere to govern the large territory that had proved so easy to invade" (p. 39). Bianco (1971) similarly remarks that "the Japanese army never took possession of the land it had conquered. It was swallowed up in the vastness of China, holding nothing but cities and connecting roads and railways" (p. 148).

2021; among others). For instance, in the two north China provinces of Hebei and Shanxi, the Japanese Army only managed to station their troops in at most two-thirds of the counties, and where they were able to do so their presence was confined to the counties and towns — "the countryside was Communist territory" (Johnson, 1962, p. 52).¹² This remained the case in 1939, even after the Japanese Army conducted the "Pacification Campaign" (*qingxiang*) to consolidate control in the occupied area in north China — the countryside was still wide open and exposed (Kataoka, 1974).

This provided exceptional opportunities for the Communists to take up the slack. They moved into the unattended villages swiftly and provided helpful assistance to the needy villagers who were desperate for leadership and organization for self-defense and survival, for fear of repeated attack by the Japanese Army.¹³ Further, they gave timely provision of a wide array of public goods such as education and agricultural cooperation, among other public services (Goodman, 2000; Keating, 1997).

But the Communists were ambitious far beyond merely providing the Chinese peasants with the help that they badly needed. The "power vacuum" thus created provided the Communists with the precious opportunity to capitalize on the Communists' influence in the countryside by developing political organizations swiftly at the grassroots level, however primitive they might be, initially. Proposed by Liu Shaoqi and endorsed by Mao, cadres were dispatched to "every county and village" in the occupied areas on the North China Plain to set up informal organizations such as party groups (*dang xiaozu*) and party branches (*dang zhibu*), the primary goal of which was to provide a particular organizational framework to guide existing members, and to attract new ones. This was considered an imperative, as local party organizations were deemed to have fallen behind the political influence that the Communists already wielded among the people. While the eventual objective of the Party was to establish formal Leninist-type organizations, given the amount of time it would take the Communists decided to compromise with less formal variants.¹⁴

The strategy of consolidating party control through informal organization building turned out to be an immense success. For example, within a year, the number of county party

¹²Although Japan had deployed up to 1.18 million of its military to China, and occupied up to 6 million kilometers of China's territory, at its greatest extent it covered only slightly over 60% of the territory.

¹³Many surviving villagers were thus forced to take up arms for self-defense (Kataoka, 1974).

¹⁴Initiated by Mao, the Politburo members voted in favor of the resolution "of vastly expanding the development of party members" (*zhonggong zhongyang guanyu daliang fashan dangyuan de queyi*) at a meeting in February 1938.

committees — the most formal organizational variant — in Shanxi province increased by 30 times (albeit from an exceedingly low base of 3 to 90), with the number of registered party members rising sharply from less than 100 to more than 50,000 by the end of 1939.

By moving into the anarchic villages, it was also part of the Communists' strategy to establish guerrilla bases from which to launch attacks into the areas occupied by the Japanese Army. Like their party building effort the guerrilla strategy was a massive success. Developing from their stronghold in Shaanxi Province, slowly but gradually the Communists infiltrated much of North China, occupying a large part of several provinces such as Hebei, Shandong, and Shanxi behind the Japanese lines. From the peasants' perspective they had strong incentives to join the guerrilla force, for at least they would be provided with some weaponry for self-defense (Bianco, 1971).¹⁵ This helps to explain why within a short time the Communists both increased their membership and expanded the size of their guerrilla base. For example, in less than four years' time Communist membership increased twenty-fold from 40,000 to 800,000 (c. 1937-40, the solid line in Figure 1). And while the Japanese retaliation in response to the famous *Hundred Regiments Offensive* launched by the Communists in late 1940 killed many cadres and decimated even more villagers,¹⁶ this only intensified the revolution further.

2.2.2 Peasant Nationalism

Nationalism was not entirely something new in wartime China; it had existed since at least the late Qing dynasty, especially after the Middle Kingdom suffered an unexpected, humiliating defeat by Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War (c. 1894-95). But at that time nationalism only appealed to a small fraction of the population, namely the "unassimilated intelligentsia and the small middle classes that grew up in the treaty ports", and hence it failed to take root on Chinese soil. Before the Japanese invasion, the Chinese peasantry were largely "absorbed in local matters and had only the dimmest sense of China (as a nation)", as such they were far too removed to feel the humiliation and territorial losses

¹⁵This seemed to be especially the case with the occupied area in North China — "the omnipresent social front of popular resistance" (Fairbank, 1986). The incentive to join the guerrilla army force was further strengthened by the fact that the peasants would be in an even more vulnerable situation if left to themselves (Bianco, 1971).

¹⁶Having killed 2,010 Japanese soldiers and injured 3,359, The *Hundred Regiments Offensive* inflicted by far the greatest casualties on the Japanese Army by the CCP. The guerrilla armed forces also caused severe damage to railway and communications lines and disrupted material supplies (Kataoka, 1974).

suffered (Johnson, 1962, p. 23 and p. 69).¹⁷

But the Japanese invasion changed the rural conditions in China in a fundamental way. The loss of life (of family members and fellow villagers) and property, the disruption of a peaceful social order, the fear of recurring invasions, and the humiliations and anxieties suffered in the course of all these misfortunes gave rise to a strong sense of unity and created demand for effective leadership to resist the invaders. In one fell swoop, the Chinese peasant realized that "his own peril was also China's peril" (Johnson, 1962, p. 26).¹⁸ While it would certainly be an exaggeration to claim that peasants were espousing the Communist ideology, the war had weakened (and divided) China so much that the Chinese peasantry simply "had no recourse but to seek the Red Army's protection" (Bianco, 1971, p. 151). Initially terrified, the peasants were soon provoked by the Japanese Army's "mopping-up" campaigns (conducted since 1938 until the very end of the war) and with it the indiscriminate pursuit of the brutal "three-all" policy (i.e., "burn all, kill all, loot all") intended to wipe out an entire ("infested") area that it suspected to contain Communists. And, on the success of the Communists' guerrilla tactics in throwing the Japanese off balance, the villagers came to hate the invaders "with all their heart and soul" (Bianco, 1971, p. 153). According to Johnson (1962), the war created what he termed "peasant nationalism", which in Bianco's (1971) words was "a nationalism of despair" (p. 153). What this narrative essentially means is that the war allowed the Communists to present themselves as nationalists and thus to win the peasantry's support "as the natural leaders of patriotic resistance to the Japanese" (Bianco, 1971, p. 154). To the peasants caught in the war, Communism and nationalism were one and the same thing; Communism was presented to the peasants as just another variety of nationalism — "a species" of nationalism in the words of Johnson (1962, p. 20). Clearly, this nationalism had its roots deeply steeped in the peasants' concern for survival and hatred of an enemy for the sufferings and humiliations they brought upon them.

¹⁷Even the patriotic Boxers who killed many foreign consulates, merchants and missionaries in the Boxer Rebellion were allegedly "nativistic and pre-political" (Johnson, 1962, p. 26); i.e., they were not aiming for political transformation.

¹⁸In Johnson's (1962) words, "(t)he peasants of the occupied area were socially mobilized by war and resistance organization, and thereby became a national population" (p. 26).

3 Estimation Strategy

3.1 Variables and Data Sources

We employ three measures as proxies for the growing influence of the CCP in wartime China. Ideally, the most straightforward approach is to enumerate the civilians who joined the communist party during this period (c. 1937-45), but those data are available only at the aggregate, national level. As an alternative, we use the regional (county-level) distribution of communist cadres who joined the Red Army and whose rank was at the level of colonel (tuan) or above in 1949 or earlier as our first proxy. The Compendium of Biographical Records (Zhongguo Kangrizhanzheng Junshi Shiliao Congshu) provides us with detailed information for the exact year in which these middle-to-upper-rank cadres joined the CCP, and the specific county in which they joined. Moreover, to account for the differences in population between counties, we normalize the number of CCP cadres by the county's pre-war population (c. 1935) to construct a density measure. Figure 2 depicts the geographic distribution of these cadres in the pre-war (c. 1921-36, Panel A) and wartime (c. 1937-45, Panel B) periods, respectively, both normalized by the county population. Inspection of the panels clearly reveals that the increase in cadre membership came predominantly from North China. Given that not everyone who joined the Party could rise through the ranks to become a colonel or higher, this particular proxy represents a lower bound estimate on the total number of cadre members who joined the CCP during the war.¹⁹ But it may also give rise to measurement error.

[Figure 2 about here]

To complement our first measure, we therefore employ the number of martyr soldiers — essentially CCP members who sacrificed their lives in the Sino-Japanese War — as our second proxy. To commemorate them, the Ministry of Veterans Affairs of the PRC constructed the China Martyrs Website (www.chinamartyrs.gov.cn/), providing detailed information of the martyr soldiers' hometown, the time (year) of martyrdom and the corresponding official rank. And while the website is reticent on the exact locale of the recruitment, available evidence suggests that martyr soldiers were mostly recruited from their hometowns (Qi,

¹⁹To ensure that this particular measure and the overall measure of CCP membership are highly correlated with each other, we plot the trend of cadres with the dash line in Figure 1 and show that the two curves exhibit a remarkably similar trend and are highly correlated with each other at 0.837.

2015). Like our first measure, this one is also enumerated at the county level and normalized by the pre-war county population. Figure 3 depicts the geographic distribution of martyr cadres in both the pre-war (c. 1921-36, Panel A) and wartime (c. 1937-45, Panel B) periods. Similar to the colonel-level cadres, there was also a notable increase in martyr soldiers in North China during the war.

[Figure 3 about here]

Our third dependent variable which we employ to complement the former two is the size of the guerrilla base as measured by its military forces in a specific location established by the CCP in 1940, obtained by digitizing a military map of 1940 from the Japanese Wartime Intelligence Archive of the same year (refer to Figure A2 in Appendix A for an illustration).

Altogether our data covers a total of 1,708 (out of 2,233) counties in 24 provinces in today's China, coinciding with "China Proper".²⁰ The three northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang are excluded as they were already occupied by the Japanese in 1931. Taiwan is also excluded as it was occupied even earlier (c. 1897). We also exclude Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, Tibet and Xinjiang because of missing data. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of our variables of interest.

[Table 1 about here]

3.2 A Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)

To identify the exogenous causes of the CCP's political ascendance, we exploit the effect of a county's discontinuous exposure to occupation by the Japanese Army, using a boundary that demarcated the occupied area in 1940 on our three dependent variables. The RDD regression assumes the following specification:

$$CCP_i = \alpha + \beta JapaneseOccupiedArea_i + f(GeographicLocation_i) + \sum_{j=1}^n seg_i^j + \pi_i \qquad (1)$$

where CCP_i represents the three outcome variables of interest in county *i*. JapaneseOccupiedArea_i is an indicator variable set to 1 if county *i* falls within the Japanese occupied area in 1940, and 0 if it is not. $f(GeographicLocation_i)$ is the RD polynomial controlling for smooth

²⁰According to Harding (1993), "China Proper' (*Zhongguo Benbu*) referred to those areas that were directly controlled by the central administrative bureaucracy", which in most of the Qing Dynasty, "consisted of the 18 provinces primarily populated by Han Chinese".

functions of geographic location. Following Dell (2010), we employ a two-dimensional RD in latitude-longitude space by controlling for polynomials in latitude and longitude. Alternatively, we also convert it into the single dimension of distance and control the polynomials of distance. Moreover, to ensure that the specification only compares counties lying on the same segment of the boundary, we split the boundary into segments of 100 km each seg_i^j , and assign the value of 1 to county *i* if it is closest to segment *j*, and 0 otherwise. The boundary of the occupied area in 1940 is obtained from the *Chronicles of Events* in Various Counties (*Gexian Luxian Shijian*); archived by the KMT, it contains details of the exact date and process by which a county succumbed to the Japanese Army and became an occupied area. We also verify the validity of our data by cross-checking against military maps archived in the Japanese Wartime Intelligence Archive of 1940, in which the areas under Japanese control — be they administered directly by the Japanese Army or indirectly by puppet troops — were clearly delineated. Figure 4 shows the boundary of the occupied area in 1940 based on the geocoded data projected onto the 1949 county maps of China.

[Figure 4 about here]

To exploit fully the exogenous variation caused by the JapaneseOccupiedArea_i, we use 1) a full sample that includes the entire 1,708 counties, 2) a subsample of counties located respectively within 400, 300, 200, and 100 kilometres of the spatial threshold from the boundary of the boundary of the occupied area (the dashed line in Figure 4 indicates the 100 kilometres bandwidth for example), and 3) a subsample of counties within the optimal bandwidth from the same boundary estimated according to Calonico et al. (2014, 2017, 2022). Following the standard procedure, we use a local linear RD polynomial as our baseline specification and document robustness to a wide range of bandwidths and RD polynomials.

3.3 Validity of the Spatial RD Design

The identification of the spatial RD relies on three assumptions: 1) the formation of the boundary was exogenous to the guerilla activities of the CCP, 2) the Japanese invasion varied discontinuously across the boundary, with faster growth of communism within the occupied area, and 3) except for the treated variable, all other confounding factors vary smoothly at the boundary (balance checks).

3.3.1 Formation of the 1940 Boundary

We begin with assumption (1). It is well documented that the frontline of the Japanese occupied area was by and large shaped by battles fought between the Japanese and KMT armies (Lary, 2010; Mitter, 2013). After capturing Kaifeng, the capital of Henan Province in the Xuzhou battle in early June of 1938, the Japanese Army threatened to take over Zhengzhou because of its strategic railway location.²¹ Should they succeed, the Japanese Army would be able to move quickly to capture Wuhan — the wartime capital of the KMT government after the fall of Nanjing — forcing the Chinese to surrender quickly (see Figure 5). To stop the Japanese from so doing, Chang Kai-shek ordered to bomb the dyke of Huayuankou on the south bank of the Yellow River. Known as the Huayuankou juedi shi*jian.* The bombing resulted in the breach of levees protecting a larger-than-expected area, spanning some 20 counties across three provinces (Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu; refer to the "red" area in Figure 5), destroying thousands of square kilometers of farmland and shifted the course of the Yellow River by several hundreds of kilometers to the south. While this strategic move effectively stalled the Japanese Army from crossing the Yellow River to chase the fleeing KMT Army (Muscolino, 2015), it killed an estimated 400,000-500,000 people, and adversely affected several million others (who were forced to leave their homes and land). Most importantly, this "heroic" decision of Chiang tarnished reputation badly (Bianco, 1971, p. 156).

On discovering that the KMT Army had already reached the country's southwest, the Japanese Army gave up the chase. Instead, they consolidated control over North China instead, occupying towns strategically located along major transport routes (in particular railways) on the northern side of the Yellow River, and wiping out remnants of the KMT bases through "mopping-up" campaigns. The evolving boundaries of the occupied areas during 1937-1940 as shown in Figure 6 reveals the Japanese enlarged territorial control of North China.²² From an identification perspective, the barricade erected by the KMT Army was to form a "frontline" boundary that effectively separated the two armies, with each holding to it on the north and south sides of the Yellow River, respectively (refer to Figure 5 for detail). This boundary was to remain relatively stable from then on, nearly until the

 $^{^{21}{\}rm The}$ capital city of Henan Province, Zhengzhou was located at the junction of the Pinghan and Longhai Railways.

²²The Japanese Army's continuing presence in North China also meant that they could extract more local resources such as coal and other daily necessities more expediently.

end of the Sino-Japanese War.

[Figures 5 and 6 about here]

3.3.2 Additional Reasons for Choosing the 1940 Boundary

In addition to the shocking bombing of the Yellow River dyke by the KMT in 1938, the validity of using the 1940 boundary as identification is also strengthened by the fact that it was not affected by the activities or influence of the CCP until late 1940, when it launched the *Hundred Regiments Offensive* and killed 2,010 Japanese soldiers and injured 3,359 others, which was by far the greatest number of casualties the CCP inflicted on the Japanese Army.²³ In retaliation, the Japanese Army stepped up mopping-up campaigns to wipe out the guerrilla bases and terrorize peasants for supporting the CCP.²⁴ More importantly, this led the Japanese to reexamine the military capacity of the Red Army.²⁵

To further prove that the 1940 boundary does not coincide with any pre-existing political, social and economic boundaries that are associated with unobserved provincial characteristics, we show in Figure A3 in Appendix A that it does not overlap with provincial boundaries.

Still another reason for choosing 1940 as the year for demarcating the boundary is that the number of civilians killed was highest in the first four years of the Japanese invasion. Figure 7, which juxtaposes the number of civilians killed by the Japanese Army and changes in Communist membership, clearly exhibits the opposite trend of the two variables. While the number of civilians killed by the Japanese declined gradually over time, Communist membership increased.²⁶ Evidence of massacres is consistent with that for civilian casualties. Of the 169 wartime massacres documented, 69% (116 cases) were committed in this earlier period.

 $^{^{23}}$ The Hundred Regiments Offensive was launched out of the concern that the KMT and the Japanese might reach a peace settlement and stop the war. Launched with the aim of destroying the railway lines and disrupting the supply of such necessities as coal, the 400,000 troops in 115 regiments of the Eighth Route Army simultaneously attacked the Japanese forces in five north Chinese provinces.

²⁴These campaigns were first carried out in late 1938 to wipe out remnants of the KMT Army after their main force retreated to the country's southwest.

²⁵Before then the Japanese had never considered the CCP to be a major military opponent. Indeed, in its initial instructions of September 23, 1937, the Japanese did not even mention communism, let alone specifying any specific measure to combat it. More precisely, the Japanese considered the CCP to be just "roving bandits" and thus never directed any major military operations against them before the *Offensive* (Secret Operation Diary of the Japanese Army, 1938-1945).

²⁶The slight blip that occurred in 1941 was the result of the retaliation launched by the Japanese Army in response to the *Hundred Regiments Offensive*.

[Figure 7 about here]

To satisfy assumption (2), namely that the Japanese invasion varied discontinuously across the boundary, with faster growth of communism within the occupied area, we simply fit the values from a local linear regression of the three outcome variables of interest in Figure 8, and confirm a distinct pattern of discontinuity between the counties located on either side of the boundary.

[Figure 8 about here]

3.4 Balance Checks

Finally, to verify assumption (3), namely, that all other confounding factors except for the treated variable vary smoothly at the boundary, we employ a balance check of a number of variables that may be correlated with the growing influence of the CCP in wartime China, by regressing them on the Japanese occupied area based on Equation (1). The results are reported in Panel A of Table 2. We begin with a set of geographic variables such as elevation, slope, and density of major rivers (columns (1) through (3)), then move on to examine climatic variables such as temperature and precipitation (columns (4) and (5)), before turning to natural resource endowment using the agricultural suitability of China's two main staple crops — rice and wheat — as proxies (columns (6) and (7)). Finally, we check for the balance of economic prosperity using population density in 1935 as proxy (column (8)). Together, the results show that the point estimate of these variables is small relative to the mean and is insignificantly different from zero, confirming that the two sets of counties — occupied and unoccupied — have no significant discontinuous differences across this wide gamut of controls. In Section 5, we will conduct additional balance checks on a number of socioeconomic variables pertaining to the various hypotheses proposed to account for the early emergence of communism in China, that is, before the Japanese invasion.

[Table 2 about here]

4 Japanese Invasion and the Rise of Communism

4.1 Effect on CCP's Wartime Ascendance

We examine the impact of Japanese invasion on the rise of the CCP using a spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD) as specified in Equation (1). The results are reported in Table

3A (density of CCP cadres — one in per thousand of population), Table 3B (density of CCP martyr soldiers — one in per thousand of population), and Table 3C (size of guerrilla base), respectively. All regression results include a full set of cubic polynomials in latitude and longitude and segment fixed effects, with robust standard errors reported.

In Table 3A, we report the coefficients of both linear regressions and those including various polynomials (ranging from quadratic to quartic) of latitude and longitude. In terms of bandwidth, we report the results for all sample counties, those fall within the 400, 300, 200, and 100-kilometer radius, respectively, as well as the optimal bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico et al. (2014, 2017). Irrespective of the choice of polynomial and bandwidth, the counties that fall within the Japanese occupied area have a significantly higher density of middle-to-upper-rank cadres. Taking the 100 kilometer-radius estimation with cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude as an example, counties within the occupied area have on average a 3.7% higher density of middle-to-upper-rank CCP cadres. While the point estimates differ across different bandwidths and polynomial controls, the results are basically similar. To further check for robustness, we employ a (more conventional) one-dimensional spatial RD model, in which we include only the linear and quadratic polynomials of distance to the boundary, and interact it with the ETA dummy (bottom panel of Table 3A). The results remain statistically significant across a wide range of bandwidths.²⁷

[Table 3A about here]

In Table 3B we employ CCP martyr soldiers as the dependent variable, and find that the occupied area exhibits a similarly significant effect on it. Once again, using the 100 kilometerradius estimation with a cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude as illustration, counties within the occupied area yield an average of 14.3% higher density of martyr soldiers; its larger magnitude supports our claim that the middle-to-upper-rank cadres is a lower bound measure of the growing influence of communism within the occupied area.

[Table 3B about here]

In Table 3C we report the results of using the size of the CCP's guerrilla base in 1940 as the dependent variable. Like the other two measures, the size of guerrilla base is not

 $^{^{27}}$ An exception is the linear polynomial in distance to the boundary within the 100 kilometer-radius. While the coefficient is not statistically significant, the magnitude is very similar to those estimated using the wider bandwidths.

only statistically significant, its magnitude is also the largest, suggesting that more people in the occupied area had joined the CCP to fight the Japanese Army. Compared to counties outside the occupied area, the guerrilla base of those within it were nearly twice as large -95.4% based on an estimate using the 100 kilometer-radius with a cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude. In all three sets of regression we also tried to cluster the standard errors at the higher prefectural and provincial levels, and adjust for spatial correlations, and the results remain unchanged.²⁸

[Table 3C about here]

4.2 Robustness Checks

4.2.1 Strategic Effects of Railway and Telegraph

An important question concerns the Japanese Army's choice of occupation — specifically the counties they decided to occupy first. Might they, for example, target counties of strategic importance — strategic in terms of replenishing daily supplies and/or disseminating information? Figure 9 shows that the occupied areas in late 1937 were already located close to railway and telegraph lines. To ensure that our RD estimates do not suffer from these omitted variables, we control for their possible effects using the shortest distance as measured from a county's centroid to the railway and telegraph lines in our regressions.

[Figure 9 about here]

Using the same specification as in Table 3, Panels A to C of Table 4 report the results for the same three dependent variables after controlling for the two infrastructural effects. While distance to the railway line has a significant effect on the rise of the CCP, distance to the telegraph does not. More importantly, inclusion of these two variables does not lessen the significant effect exerted by the occupied area on all three dependent variables; even the corresponding magnitudes are similar to those in Table 3. Regardless, we include them as control in the analysis that follows.

[Table 4 about here]

 $^{^{28}}$ In addition, we also examined the effect of the change in the boundaries of the Japanese occupied area on the rising influence of the CCP. The results reported in Table A1 of Appendix A show that, except for 1938, the remaining years — from 1939 to 1942 — all have a significant effect on the density of the CCP cadres and martyr soldiers respectively.

4.2.2 A Quasi-Natural Experiment from the Breach of the Yellow River Dyke in 1938

As mentioned in Section 3.1.1, a certain segment of the boundary of the Japanese occupied area in 1940 was shaped by the flood caused by the bombing of the Yellow River Dyke. This shorter "natural boundary" thus affords us an invaluable opportunity to check the robustness of our use of the entire 1940 boundary to identify the causal effect of Japanese occupation on the rising influence of the CCP. Specifically, we select that segment of the 1940 boundary entirely made up of the flooded area and re-estimate Equation 1 by comparing counties lying within the occupied area with those outside it within a radius of 100 kilometers, 70 kilometers, and an optimal bandwidth from this boundary segment, respectively (Calonico et al., 2014, 2017). As usual, we control for the cubic polynomials of latitude and longitude and segment fixed effects, as well as distances to the railway and telegraph lines. To ensure that the growing influence of the CCP was not caused by a reduction in the political support for the KMT caused by the larger-than-expected flood, we construct a new dummy variable to indicate whether a county had been affected directly by the flood as additional control. The results are reported in Table 5. First, we find that the Japanese occupied area continues to exert a significant effect on the growing influence of the communist party in the presence of these additional controls, albeit the coefficients are now slightly smaller. Importantly, the dummy variable indicating whether a county was affected by the flood has no significant effect on the rise of the CCP, ruling out the concern that support of the CCP was perhaps achieved at the expense of the KMT because of the latter's bombing of the dyke rather than the CCP's effort in helping the civilians to cope with the war atrocities.

[Table 5 about here]

4.2.3 Effect of Wartime Refugee Migration

The spatial RD estimation requires that no individuals can manipulate their treatment status — an assumption that may not hold, however, if those who were concerned with the threat of the Japanese Army decided to flee the occupied area. However, this should not be a serious concern, because there was essentially no voluntary migration; those who fled were in fact "moved out of the way as the Japanese tsunamied their way through their neighborhoods and then returned" (Van de Ven, 2018, p. 110). Assuming that there were a few isolated

incidences of people moving about anyway, the chances were that this temporary "migration" occurred in a single direction, i.e., away from the occupied area, which would thus only reduce the influence of the CCP in the occupied area, biasing our estimates downward. To make sure that migration does not present a threat to our estimation, we employ a "donut-hole" RD approach as a falsification test by removing observations located closer to the discontinuous cutoff (Cattaneo et al., 2022). In our specific context, we exclude those observations located closest to the boundary of the Japanese occupied area, reasoning that villagers residing closest to the boundary would take advantage of their proximity to the boundary and flee. Figure 10 plots the coefficients of the "donut-hole" estimation by excluding observations within 10 - 80 kilometers from the boundary using the optimal bandwidth estimates as in column (6) of Table 3, with the zero radius in the far left corresponding to the original RD estimates in which no observations are excluded. The most important finding from Figure 10 is that the coefficients are robustly stable across various "donut-hole" radiuses, with the same expected sign and similar magnitude to that of the zero radius, suggesting that migration, even if it did occur, does not undermine our earlier results.²⁹

[Figure 10 about here]

4.2.4 Using the Pre-war Period as a Falsification Test

The hypothesis that the Japanese invasion had a significant causal effect on the rise of the CCP should be confined to the period *after* the invasion but not before it. To verify this, we conduct a falsification test by regressing the same three measures regarding the local influence of the CCP but for the pre-war period 1927-36 on the 1940 boundary. To do this, we collected data for the number of CCP cadres who joined the party before 1937, the number of CCP martyr soldiers who were sacrificed in the battles fought during the First Civil War with KMT (c. 1927-37),³⁰ and the number of guerrilla bases (typically called "revolutionary bases") established by the Red Army in the same period. We report the results of these checks in columns (1) - (3) of Table 6 for the density of middle-to-upper rank cadres, columns (4) - (6) for the density of CCP martyr soldiers, and in columns (7) - (9) for the dummy variable of whether a county supported a guerilla base — the latter information

²⁹This conclusion holds even though the level of significance gradually decreases as we expand the radius further, resulting in more observations being dropped (as shown by the changing confidence intervals).

³⁰For example, there was an incident in which a force of 9,000 men who belonged to the New Fourth Army were encircled and destroyed by a KMT division (Bianco, 1971, p. 154).

is available from Shengzhi Dashiji or Provincial Chronicles of Events in the Sino-Japanese $War.^{31}$ Unlike the results for the wartime period, none of the coefficients exhibits a significant difference, confirming that the 1940 boundary was not correlated with the determinants of the spatial distribution of CCP's influence before the war.

[Table 6 about here]

5 Competing Explanations for the Early (Pre-war) Rise of the CCP

Although our task is to explain the rise of the CCP in wartime China, it is important to rule out the potential *path dependent* effects of a number of possible confounding factors that others have proposed to account for the early — pre-war — rise of the CCP; specifically by ensuring that the RDD boundary does not pick up any effect of these competing explanations. The competing explanations include "modernization theory", "class consciousness", "exploitation by landlords and/or the local state", "social organization", and a "nationalist revolution".

5.1 Modernization and Revolution

According to proponents of modernization theory, economic development in general and education in particular are important determinants of democracy or revolution (Barro, 1999; Lipset, 1959; Wickham-Crowley, 1992).³² In the historical context of China, modernization began in the mid-19th century with the forced opening of various treaty ports for trade and other purposes, leading to the subsequent comprehensive reform of its education system, which entailed the wholesale replacement of its millennia-long Confucian-based civil service exam by a Western curriculum. We employ three measures as proxies for the effects of modernization. The first is a dummy variable indicating whether a county was a designated treaty port,³³ while the second is the number of modern firms established during 1840-1937.³⁴

 $[\]overline{}^{31}$ Information on guerilla bases before 1937 is restricted to only whether a county had such a base but not its size.

 $^{^{32}}$ For instance, using a large panel data set, Barro (1999) finds a significant positive relationship between primary school attainment and measures of democracy.

³³Altogether 112 treaty ports were established between 1842 and 1930 (Kung, 2022).

 $^{^{34}}$ According to Chang (1989), who compiled the pertinent data, modern firms were (a) powered by steam engine or electricity, (b) relatively large, (c) had a registered capital of at least 10,000 silver *yuan* or

Last but not least, we employ the number of primary and middle schools in a county on the cusp of the Japanese invasion (c. 1935). Columns (1) through (3) in Table 7 clearly show that the two areas separated by the 1940 boundary are balanced in terms of all three measures of modernization.

[Table 7 about here]

5.2 Class Consciousness

From a Marxist perspective, revolution is the outcome when the working class collectively awakes to a "consciousness" that the time has come to overthrow the ruling class — specifically "how a class in itself is transformed into a class for itself". While there were incidents of workers' protests in factories located in the treaty ports and industrialized towns (Perry, 1993), it should be borne in mind that in China, industrialization in the 1930s was still in its infancy (refer to Figure A4 in the Appendix). Nevertheless, we examine this hypothesis by employing the proportion of unionized workers in the overall universe of industrial workers in 1933 as a proxy. The data is obtained from *General Investigative Report on Trade Unions in 1933 (Ershiernian Gedi Gonghui Diaocha Zongbaogao)*, published by the KMT's Central People's Movement Steering Committee. As column (4) shows, there is similarly no significant difference in our proxy for class consciousness between the counties on either side of the boundary.

5.3 Exploitation by Landlords and Local State

Given the predominance of China's rural economy and the alleged unequal distribution of land, exploitation of landless peasants by their landlords through either exorbitant land rents or hired labor is considered by many to be a key determinant of the Communist revolution in China (Moore, 1966; Hofheinz Jr., 1969; Selden, 1971; and Skocpol, 1979). However, this hypothesis remains empirically uncontested because of the lack of data. To overcome this problem, we employ a farm survey conducted by the Republican (KMT) Government in 1934, in which the socioeconomic categories of tenant farmers, semi-owner-cultivators, and owner-cultivators, respectively, were enumerated. Intuitively, the greater the proportion of tenant farmers in a county, the more exploitative social relations tend to be in that county.³⁵

approximately 1,094 pound sterling, (d) employed at least 30 workers, (e) produced an annual output of at least 50,000 silver *yuan* in value, and (f) adopted modern (hierarchical) management practices.

 $^{^{35}}$ A caveat is that tenancy rates are by no means the only indicator of exploitation. Consider the two southcentral provinces of Jiangxi and Anhui. While both had high tenancy rates, Jiangxi turned out to be

But landlords were not the only source of peasant burdens. In particular, given that large landowners were far and few in North China, exorbitant taxes and unregulated fees and levies imposed by local governments were a more likely source of peasants' dissatisfaction (Bianco, 1971; Chen, 1992; Duara, 1991; Goodman, 2000; Keating, 1997; Selden, 1971, 1995).³⁶ To test this particular hypothesis, we use land tax per capita in 1934 as proxy. Reported in columns (5) and (6), we find no significant difference in any case in either tenancy rates or land tax between the two sets of counties separated by the 1940 boundary.

5.4 Social Organization and Violent Culture

If social organization and the attendant social capital embedded therein was instrumental in mobilizing public support for the Nazi Party in the 1930s (Satyanath et al., 2017), then rural social networks and communities such as lineage organization might be expected to play a similar role in mobilizing peasants' support for the CCP (Feng and Goodman, 2000; Li, 2009). Evidence suggests that, in mobilizing the peasantry the CCP did indeed draw upon the respective networks of the "Red Gun Society" and the salt smugglers (Perry, 1980; Thaxton, 1997). Consistent with this concept is Rowe's (2007) finding that a seven-century-long "violent culture" in the two counties (Huangan and Macheng) of Hubei Province provided an important impetus for the subsequent communist revolution. To verify the alleged effects of lineage organization, we enumerate the editions of genealogical books a county had revised; presumably the more frequently a county revised its genealogical books the stronger the tradition of clans and lineages (Chen et al., 2020). As a proxy for a violent culture, we enumerate the number of secret societies operating in a county and the corresponding number of conflicts occurring therein, both during the Qing dynasty. As reported in columns (7) through (9), none of these proxies differs significantly between the two sets of counties across the 1940 boundary.

5.5 Effect of the 1911 Nationalist Revolution

Given that the CCP and KMT cooperated in the 1920s under the rubric of the "First United Front", this raises the concern that the communist revolution might have been influenced by the KMT. This would be the case especially in terms of military training, as the *Huangpu*

a staunch supporter of communism (as manifested in the early revolutionary base of *Jinggangshan*), while Anhui was never a major seedbed of the communist revolution (Hofheinz Jr., 1969).

³⁶The reduction in interest rates was also what the Communists were trying to achieve (see, e.g., Bianco, 1971).

Military Academy, which trained many of the CCP's future leaders, was established jointly by the two parties. To rule out the possible influence of the KMT, and in light of the fact that many KMT leaders were previously heavily involved in the 1911 Nationalist Revolution that brought the 2,000-year-old imperial regime to an end, we trace its possible effect by identifying the hometowns of members of *Tongmenhui* — the revolutionary alliance that preceded the KMT — to check whether the counties sampled across the discontinued boundary are also balanced. Reporting the result in column (10), we find no discontinuity between the counties on either side of the boundary.

6 Accounting for the Rise of the CCP

To further substantiate the claim that the relationship between the Japanese invasion and CCP growth is causal, we explore three possible underlying channels. The first is "power vacuum", whereas the second pertains to party building. The third, but not the least, is "war suffering" which consequently led to the rise of peasant nationalism.

6.1 Power Vacuum

With the retreat of the KMT to the country's southwest in 1938, a power vacuum was created in the counties where they lost the battles and abandoned them, and China was simply too vast a territory for the Japanese Army to garrison throughout. As a compromise, the Japanese established "puppet troops" made up of captive KMT soldiers and remnants of local warlords and bandits under the so-called "Puppet Manchuria Regime" to garrison areas they deemed strategically less important (Goodman, 2013, Johnson, 1962). It turned out that up to two-thirds of the 811 occupied counties (67%) were garrisoned by puppet troops. While with a force of 600,000-strong militia the puppet troops were clearly sizeable, they were not, however, as motivated as the official army to fight for the Japanese, not to mention that they were not as militarily effective as their Japanese counterparts. In this context, we conjecture that the CCP took advantage of the weaker military capabilities of the puppet troops and strengthened their influence in areas in which they garrisoned. To test this conjecture, we geocoded the occupied areas garrisoned by puppet troops as distinct from those occupied by the Japanese Army based on maps in the Japanese Wartime Intelligence Archive, hence our explanatory variable of the 1940 boundary is now subdivided into two dummy variables — one representing the puppet troops and the other the Japanese Army (the non-puppet troops). Our dependent variables remain the same.

The results in Table 8 substantiate the conjecture that the areas garrisoned by puppet troops were precisely those in which the CCP made the most progress. In terms of magnitude, the densities of middle-to-upper-rank CCP cadres and martyr soldiers grew by 3.4% - 4.3%and 31% - 56.3% respectively more in the puppet troop areas in 1940, while the size of the guerilla base increased by 41.1% - 47.3% in the same year. To make sure that the significance does not accrue entirely to the puppet troop area, we subtract the effect due to the Japanese Army from that of puppet troops $(\beta_1 - \beta_0)$, and find that the net difference between the two is still significant.

[Table 8 about here]

6.2 Mobilization through Local Party Building

The CCP was well known for its organizational capacity to mobilize the people to support its anti-Japanese cause (Dagfinn, 2008; Hofheinz Jr., 1969; Levine, 1987). These efforts were documented meticulously in a compendium entitled *Sheng Gongchandang Zuzhishi Ziliao* (*Provincial Archive on the History of the CCP's Party Organization*), according to which three main types or levels of party organizations were being established at the county level between 1940 and 1945. The most primitive or loose form of local party organization was the spontaneously developed and loosely organized party group or *dang xiaozu*.³⁷ Party chapter or branch (*dang zhibu*) was at the next, higher stage, one in which the locally elected leaders had to be approved by the authorities above. The approved cadres became a part of the formal Party organization. Established directly by the Central Committee, the Party Committee was considered the highest level of organization established at the local county — level in the wartime, as officials were sent to administer the counties directly.

To verify whether local Party building efforts served as an effective channel, we constructed three related measures of local party organization. The first is a dummy variable indicating whether a county had established a party committee — the highest level of organizational building in the countryside; the second a linear variable measuring the duration (in months) of the county party committee, if there was one; and the third an ordinal variable indicating the specific level of party organization development in a county, which is set to 0

 $^{^{37}}$ Consisting of no more than a hundred people (*jishi ren*), a party group was one that had yet to reach a critical mass for the Party to develop a more formal organization by sending officials to establish a local chapter or even a county Party committee.

if no party organization of any kind was found in the period 1940-45, 1 if there was a party group, 2 if there was a party branch, and 3 if there was a party committee.

Table 9 reports the results of regressing these three variables on the dummy variable of the Japanese occupied area using the various bandwidth specifications as before and controlling for the cubic polynomials and segment fixed effects. The results squarely confirm that a party committee was significantly more likely to be established in counties within the occupied area during 1940-45, and with a longer duration. In terms of intensity, counties inside the occupied area were also more likely to establish more sophisticated organizations. Together, all three variables consistently suggest that the CCP were effective in building party organizations inside the Japanese occupied area.

[Table 9 about here]

6.3 War Suffering

We now turn to examine our third and last channel, namely nationalism, using several measures of war crimes committed by the Japanese Army on the Chinese civilians as proxies. War suffering is an overarching concept that, for ease of empirical testing is more conveniently decomposed into two specific but inter-related dimensions. The first is "struggle for survival", a sentiment arising from the civilians' perceived threat to their lives arising from the Japanese invasion. The second pertains to "humiliation and hatred", a sentiment aroused by such war crimes as rape and sexual subservience. While crimes of this nature do not present an immediate threat to life, they arouse a strong sense of humiliation on the civilians and thus hatred towards the offender.³⁸ To test the specific channel of struggle for survival, we employ the number of civilians killed by the Japanese Army as proxy. The data are drawn from a survey conducted by the KMT government in 1946 and subsequently made available in the Collection of Provincial Archives on Population Casualty and Asset Loss during the Sino-Japanese War (Kangrizhanzheng Shiqi Renkoushangwang Ji Caichanshunshi), edited by the CCP History Research Office of the Provincial Party Committee (2016).³⁹ An alternative measure is a dummy variable indicating whether a county experienced mass killing — essentially a massacre — defined as one with a minimum weekly casualty number of 800

³⁸For example, in some rape incidences "fathers and brothers were forced (by the Japanese Army) at bayonet point to participate" (Bianco, 1971, p. 152). Hatred, as Bianco (1971) notes, "is the most powerful agent of national self-consciousness" (p. 153).

³⁹Given that these data were collected by the loser of the war, viz., the KMT, its validity is likely less biased.

civilians. We choose this particular variable because the Japanese Army brutally massacred many villagers in the two northern provinces of Shanxi and Hebei in the earlier years of their invasion (Peattie et al., 2011).⁴⁰ There were altogether 169 such massacres documented during the Sino-Japanese War. We collected this data from the *Collection of Major Massacre of Civilians during the Sino-Japanese War (Kangrizhanzheng Shiqi Quanguo Zhongda Can'an)*, published by the Party History Research Center of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee in 2014.

To examine the channel of humiliation and hatred, we employ the number of rape cases and a dummy variable indicating whether a comfort women center had been established (explicitly demanding sexual services to be provided by Chinese women) in a county as proxies. At the county level, the data for the number of rape cases are obtained from the chapter entitled "Chronicles of Major Events" in the county gazetteers, while the data on comfort women centers are obtained from Su et al.'s (2016) A Study of Comfort Women during the Sino-Japanese War (Qinhuarijun Weianfu Wenti Yanjiu). Altogether "comfort women" centers had been established in as many as 216 counties, with an estimated 0.2-0.4 million women forced into sexual slavery (Su et al., 2016). Given that rape cases as reported in county gazetteers may be subject to the possible bias of bad memory or even exaggeration, comfort women centers arguably provide a solid check on its robustness as it was enumerated by both KMT and Japanese governments.

Altogether we have four variables to serve as proxies for the two types of war crime and the related sentiments of struggle for survival and humiliation and hatred. Before regressing all four proxies on the boundary, we plot the fitted values of respectively the densities of the civilians killed (our key proxy for the sentiment of struggle for survival) and rape cases (our key proxy for humiliation and hatred), from a local linear regression in Figure 11 as an intuitive check.⁴¹ We find that there is indeed a sharp discontinuity in the magnitude of both types of war crime between counties on either side of the boundary in 1940.

[Figure 11 about here]

To further confirm the visual results, we examine the effect of Japanese Army's brutality

⁴⁰As Lucien Bianco graphically describes: "Poisonous fumes were pumped into tunnels in which the local population had taken refuge (800 inhabitants of one Hopei village were asphyxiated in this manner one sunny day in the summer of 1942)" (p. 152). The provocative effect of massacres on villagers joining the guerrilla force is well identified by Wei (1993): in eight Hebei counties, the villagers were so provoked by the massacres they volunteered to join the guerrilla force, which increased six-fold.

⁴¹Both measures are normalized by the county's pre-war, 1935, population.

by regressing the number of civilians killed and the incidence of massacres on the occupied area in Panel A of Table 10. Based on the results of a 100 kilometer-radius estimation with cubic polynomials in both latitude and longitude (columns (2) and (5)), we find that, compared to counties outside the occupied area, those within it suffered significantly larger casualties, 74%, in terms of the number of civilians killed, and a massacre was twice as likely $(e^{1.089} - 1)$.

[Table 10 about here]

We report the results of the effect of sex crime in Panel B of Table 10, and find that both measures of sex crime are significantly higher within the occupied area. The findings that the people within the occupied area were suffering more from humiliation in the form of sex crime is consistent with our observation in Panel A. In terms of magnitude, and based on the 100 kilometer-radius estimation with cubic polynomials in both latitude and longitude (columns (8) and (11)), there were 35% more rape cases within the occupied area (compared with counties located outside it).⁴² Unsurprisingly, it was six times ($e^{2.009} - 1$) more likely that there would be a comfort women center in a county within the occupied area.

7 Why not KMT?

A question that historians have asked repeatedly is why did the KMT fail to take the same advantage of wartime conditions as the CCP, who engaged eagerly and effectively in guerrilla warfare? Going by one view, the KMT's failure to engage in guerrilla warfare behind the Japanese lines was a huge missed opportunity (Bianco, 1971, p. 149).⁴³ A simple answer is that the KMT was the dominant political party in China and thus had to bear the brunt of the fearsome attack of the Japanese invasion, and they were completely overmatched. The military defeats thus led Chiang to pursue the strategy of "trading space with time", hoping that the vastness of China's territory would allow them to buy time while waiting for military and other assistance from the international community, particularly the

⁴²Rape cases occurred in the non-occupied areas as well, in instances where the Japanese Army made temporarily advances but eventually failed and retreated.

⁴³The fact that the KMT maintained only 56,000 soldiers in North China vis-á-vis the CCP's 160,000, and even then the KMT guerrilla forces were in most cases formed on local initiative, clearly reveals that (perhaps rightly so) guerrilla warfare was never considered by the KMT to be a viable military strategy (Japanese Wartime Intelligence Archive, 1941).

U.S. (Bu and Wang, 2019; Johnson, 1962, Van de Ven, 2018; Yang, 2010).⁴⁴ In so doing, however, Chiang left millions of civilians stranded in the occupied areas with no protection, governance or leadership against the Japanese invasion. As the KMT General Sun Yuanliang lamented: "When we implemented the scorched earth policy in the beginning of the War of Resistance, we encouraged the population to move inland and disperse. But we did not make any appropriate arrangements for our loyal compatriots, we extended no helping hand to refugees with no place to go; we just let them scatter like rats, to survive or die. This probably was the beginning of us losing the trust of the people in the mainland" (Van de Ven, 2018, p.108). More generally, Chiang's stubborn insistence on destroying the Communists while tolerating the Japanese assaults on the nation's integrity (i.e., "unification and then resistance") gave rise to the popular perception that the KMT could not be counted on as the leader of national salvation (Bianco, 1971; see also Saich, 2021).⁴⁵

This stood in sharp contrast with the CCP; they were not only the smaller and weaker political party of the two and as such were blessed by the neglect of the Japanese Army until much later, giving them time and space to get their act together. More importantly, by reducing rents and tax burdens and slashing interest rates — so-called "economic and social programs" — the Communists were perceived by the masses as being unprecedentedly responsive to the people's needs, "contradicting (the peasants') entire previous experiences of the military", and, at long last winning their support (Bianco, 1971, p. 158).⁴⁶

8 Persistent Effect of Japanese Invasion on Nationalism

To verify the claim that nationalism was the key driving force behind civilians' support for the CCP in wartime China, ideally we would have a measure of wartime nationalism. However, that is simply too demanding for the historical context. Thus, we can only conduct an indirect test by examining whether war-induced nationalism has had long-term effects.

 $^{^{44}{\}rm Chiang}$ had good precedent — the Russian Empire successfully used exactly the same strategy to defeat Napoleon in the Napoleonic Wars.

⁴⁵Written more than 50 years ago Bianco (1971) was simply of the view that Chiang's "priorities" of getting rid of the Communists first before they acted all out on the Japanese were all wrong.

⁴⁶As Bianco (1971) writes: "What strange soldiers they were, who paid for what they bought, cleaned up the rooms they stayed in, mingled socially with the villagers, and were not above lending a hand in the fields! They could hardly be distinguished from the local villagers" (p. 158).

If they do, we may infer that nationalist sentiment was distinctly stronger in the occupied areas.⁴⁷ There are various ways in which a national (group) identity — including political attitudes and preferences — can be established; education is one (Alesina et al., 2019), the social construction of a narrative based on the collective memory of epic historical events a social group has experienced, is another (Anderson, 1991; Halbwachs and Coser, 1992; Smith, 1999). Moreover, to foster patriotism and strengthen regime support over the long run, political leaders can endeavor to transmit the collective memories of the "chosen traumas and glories" to succeeding generations by indoctrinating ideas through school curricula and social propaganda, at ritualistic ceremonies, and so forth (Smith, 1999; Wang, 2012; Volkan, 1998). For example, in an attempt to eliminate the legacy of dictatorship and strengthen support for democracy, Spain passed the "Historical Memory Law" (Ley de Memoria Historica) in 2007 to eliminate every single Francoist symbol from the public spaces of buildings, street names, etc. From time to time, the CCP has similarly reminded the people of the collective (painful) memory inflicted by the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War whenever it attempts to rally mass support — a phenomenon referred to by political scientists as "state-led nationalism" (Doshi, 2021; Wang, 2012; Weiss, 2014; Zhao, 1998, 2004).⁴⁸

To verify whether war-induced nationalism has persistent effects, we begin by calculating the scores of the surveyed respondents on questions designed to probe their attitudes toward nationalism from an online survey entitled "China Political Compass Survey".⁴⁹ There are altogether five questions related to: (1) national unification and territorial interest, (2) state capacity and the legitimacy of using military force, (3) attitudes toward reunification with Taiwan, (4) perceptions of the Western hegemony on China's rise, and (5) the promotion of international competition (such as sports) and national glory (see Appendix C for details). The pertinent data were obtained from the 2014 survey with a sample of 171,830 respondents. As the respondents' IP addresses are included in the survey, we could trace their residential location to the prefecture level. Based on scores calculated according to the respondents' answers to these questions, we generate a variable that measures the strength of nationalist

⁴⁷Even where there are long-term effects, we are not asking the question "why nationalist sentiments persist over time in the occupied areas", which goes beyond the scope of this paper.

⁴⁸For example, the CCP has since 1991 revised the history syllabus of primary schools, emphasized the importance of nation building by appealing to the collective memory of humiliation caused by foreign military invasions, launched a patriotic education campaign, and prohibited the use of languages of ethnic minorities and local dialects in schools (Wang, 2012).

⁴⁹The survey was initiated by a group of graduate students and researchers at Peking University in 2007 on the website zuobiao.me.

sentiment of these respondents using principal component analysis.

Second, is it possible that those who suffered more during the Sino-Japanese War (as measured by civilian casualties) hold a more negative view of Japan today as well as importing less from it? From this perspective, we examine the question "what is your perception toward Japan?" from the Asian Barometer survey conducted in 2014 by the Hu Fu Center for East Asia Democratic Studies. In addition, we also examine whether collective war memory had real consequences on actual consumer behavior, using the total value of goods imported from Japan between 2000 and 2011, and the total number of sushi restaurants in China in 2014, as proxies. These analyses are similarly conducted at the prefectural level.

Our third test is premised on the term "Chinese Dream" (*Zhongguomeng*), a nationalistic concept promulgated by the paramount CCP leader, Xi Jinping. Soon after he became the national leader in 2012, Xi appealed to the people collectively to endeavor to restore China's lost national greatness from the "humiliating" history of the late 19^{th} and early 20^{th} centuries (the "century of humiliation", see, e.g., Doshi, 2021); the slogan "Chinese Dream" (*Zhong-guomeng*) was construed to portray a powerful imagery of the national greatness of China's glorious past. Since then, the term has appeared frequently in official announcements, news propaganda and even school texts, and prompted many to search for its nuanced elaboration on the internet. Assuming that a more intensive search for the term probably implies greater support for the regime, we enumerate, prefecture by prefecture, the frequencies with which the slogan "Chinese Dream" appeared on the Chinese search engine Baidu between 2012 and 2015.⁵⁰

Finally, we examine whether memories of the Japanese invasion are closely associated with greater support for the regime, by using the question "to what extent do you trust the government in China?" taken from the China General Social Survey (CGSS) of 2006, a national representative survey conducted by the People's University of China.

The results of this analysis are reported in Table 11. First, respondents who are currently residents of formerly occupied area exhibit significantly stronger support for nationalism (column (1)). Consistently, respondents in the formerly occupied area also exhibit a significantly more negative attitude towards Japan today (column (2)). Putting the money where their mouths were, these respondents imported a significantly lower value of goods from Japan

 $^{^{50}}$ From 2016 onwards *Baidu* no longer provided data on the search frequencies for the term. While crude, researchers have found a strong, positive correlation between search frequencies on popular search engines and consumption of a wide range of consumables such as automobile, real estate, tourism, and so on (Choi and Varian, 2009), as well as political support and electoral outcomes (Stephens-Davidowitz, 2017).

during 2000-2011; as well, there were significantly fewer Japanese restaurants in these prefectures today (columns (3) - (4)).⁵¹ Third, internet searches for "Chinese Dream" were significantly more frequent in the former occupied area (column (5)). Last, the same respondents have significantly greater trust in the government (column (6)). Together, these results coalesce with the hypothesis that the Japanese invasion has produced a strong, persistent effect on nationalism and regime support that lasts to this day.

[Table 11 about here]

9 Conclusion

"The CCP's rise to power was the most significant revolutionary movement of the twentieth century" (Saich, 2021, p. 152). For some time now, the Chinese Communist Party has been a major political force to be reckoned with in today's international economic and political order. However, its historic rise to power was not inevitable given the uneven military strengths of the KMT and CCP at a time when the militarily even more powerful Japan invaded China. Mao's sarcastic remarks thanking the Japanese for their untoward invasion may be taken to imply that, had it not been for their invasion and war crimes — the counterfactual — the great majority of the Chinese civilians would not have woken to the urgent call of acting together for a unified cause in fighting a powerful enemy under the banner of nationalism.

By constructing a unique historical data set from a rich variety of sources, including the recently released Japanese Wartime Intelligence archives, we find a strong relationship between Japanese military aggression and the CCP's political ascendance. By advancing their influence, the CCP strategically exploited the power vacuum in areas that the Japanese Army failed to garrison. The CCP also received greater support from civilians as it was the party that stood by the people who suffered from various kinds of war crime inflicted on them by the Japanese Army, cultivating distinctly stronger sentiments of nationalism in them. Our argument of a war-induced nationalism finds further support from the suggestive evidence that we have identified on its persistent effects over time.

 $^{^{51}}$ To ensure that we have enough observations for the search, we only use the full sample in the regression.

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Figures and Tables



Figure 1. Number of CCP Members and Middle-to-Upper Rank Communist Party Cadres, 1921-45





Panel B. Wartime Period (1937-1945)



Figure 3. Geographic Distribution of CCP Martyr Soldiers, 1921-45

Panel B. Wartime Period (1937-1945)





Figure 5. Breaching of the Yellow River Dykes



Figure 6. Changing Frontlines of the Japanese Occupied Areas in China, 1937-1940



Figure 7. Number of Civilians Killed by the Japanese Army and CCP Cadre Membership







Figure 9. Telegraph Lines, Railway Networks, and the Japanese Occupied Area, 1938

Figure 10. Donut Hole RD Estimations, by Hole Radius







Variables	# C	of Mean	Std.	Min	Max
	Obs.		Dev.		
Japanese Occupied Area	1,708	0.307	0.461	0	
Density of Middle-to-Upper-Rank CCP Cadre	1,708	0.018	0.066	0	1.386
(one in 1,000 population, logged)					
Density of CCP Martyr Soldier	1,708	0.257	0.524	0	5.777
(one in 1,000 population, logged)					
Size of Guerrilla Base, (logged)	1,708	3.127	3.542	0	9.210
Puppet Troops Area $(=1)$	1,708	0.181	0.314	0	1
County Party Committee (=1)	1,708	0.125	0.524	0	1
Duration of County Party Committee (1940-1945)	1,708	0.065	0.141	0	ю
Rank of Party Organization (1940-1945)	1,708	0.705	1.525	0	က
Density of Number of Civilians Killed	1,708	0.546	1.098	0	5.540
(one in 1,000 population, logged)					
Massacre $(=1)$	1,708	0.086	0.202	0	Ξ
Density of Rape Cases (one in 1,000 population, logged)	1,708	0.142	0.873	0	2.540
Comfort Women Center $(=1)$	1.708	0.051	0.165	0	

	Elevation	Slope	Rivers	Temperatı	re Precipitati	on Rice	Wheat	Population
			$\operatorname{Density}$			$\mathbf{Suitability}$	Suitability	Density
								(1935)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)
panese Occupied Area	1.485	0.418	1.024	0.012	1.239	-0.093	-0.143	0.323
	(3.123)	(0.679)	(2.435)	(0.032)	(3.123)	(0.140)	(0.394)	(0.534)
ubic Polynomials of XY	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes	Yes	Yes
gments Fixed Effects	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	Y_{es}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes
umber of Observations	1708	1708	1708	1708	1708	1708	1708	1708

Check	
Balance	
сi	
ble	

Table 3A. Effect of Japanese Army'	's Destruction	t on the Rise o	of the Chinese	Communist	Party, Spatial	RD Estimation
			War Pe	riod (1937-194	15)	
		Density of	CCP Cadre (one in $1,000$ _I	population, lo	gged)
	All	<=400km	<=300km	<=200km	<=100km	Optimal
						Bandwidth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
No RD Polynomial	0.030^{***}	0.022^{***}	0.021^{***}	0.023^{***}	0.023^{***}	0.024^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Polynomials in Latitude and Longitude						
Linear Polynomial	0.023^{***}	0.031^{***}	0.031^{***}	0.030^{***}	0.031^{***}	0.024^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.001)
Quadratic Polynomial	0.028^{***}	0.031^{***}	0.034^{***}	0.033^{***}	0.034^{***}	0.024^{***}
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.001)
Cubic Polynomial	0.029^{***}	0.034^{***}	0.034^{***}	0.035^{***}	0.037^{***}	0.024^{***}
	(0.007)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.001)
Quartic Polynomial	0.031^{***}	0.034^{***}	0.031^{***}	0.031^{***}	0.031^{***}	0.024^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Polynomials in Distance to Boundary						
Linear Polynomial	0.020^{***}	0.019^{***}	0.021^{***}	0.022^{***}	0.018	0.024^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.007)
Quadratic Polynomial	0.016^{***}	0.019^{***}	0.021^{***}	0.022^{***}	0.022^{**}	0.024^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Interacted Linear Polynomial	0.018^{***}	0.018^{***}	0.022^{***}	0.023^{***}	0.022^{**}	0.024^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Segment Fixed Effects	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	${ m Yes}$	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1708	1035	932	807	540	921
* n<0 10. ** n<0 05. *** n<0 01 Bohnst star	ndard error in n	arentheses Con	stant added hut	not renorted		

Table 3B. Effect of Japanese Army'	's Destruction	n on the Rise o	of the Chinese	Communist	Party, Spatial	RD Estimation
			War Pe	riod (1937-194	15)	
	Ι	Density of CCI	P Martyr Sold	lier (one in 1,0	000 populatio	n, logged)
	All	<=400km	<=300km	$\leq =200 \mathrm{km}$	<=100km	Optimal
						Bandwidth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
No RD Polynomial	0.476^{***}	0.393^{***}	0.374^{***}	0.330^{***}	0.253^{***}	0.140^{**}
	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.059)
Polynomials in Latitude and Longitude						
Linear Polynomial	0.295^{***}	0.193^{***}	0.185^{***}	0.180^{***}	0.134^{***}	0.140^{**}
	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.059)
Quadratic Polynomial	0.230^{***}	0.223^{***}	0.225^{***}	0.220^{***}	0.166^{***}	0.140^{**}
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.059)
Cubic Polynomial	0.239^{***}	0.160^{***}	0.142^{***}	0.142^{***}	0.143^{***}	0.140^{**}
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.059)
Quartic Polynomial	0.167^{***}	0.159^{***}	0.165^{***}	0.157^{***}	0.133^{***}	0.140^{**}
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.059)
Polynomials in Distance to Boundary						
Linear Polynomial	0.360^{***}	0.175^{***}	0.121^{**}	0.088	0.166^{*}	0.140^{**}
	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.069)	(0.085)	(0.059)
Quadratic Polynomial	0.229^{***}	0.102	0.117^{*}	0.124^{*}	0.161^{**}	0.140^{**}
	(0.046)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.059)
Interacted Linear Polynomial	0.194^{***}	0.129^{**}	0.133^{**}	0.133^{**}	0.172^{**}	0.140^{**}
	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.078)	(0.059)
Segment Fixed Effects	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes
Observations	1708	1035	932	807	540	894
* n<0 10. ** n<0 05. *** n<0 01 Bohilst star	ndard error in 1	arentheses Con	stant added hut	: not reported		

Table 3C. Effect of Japanese Army'	's Destruction	on the Rise c	of the Chinese	Communist	Party, Spatial	RD Estimation
			War Per	riod (1937-194	15)	
		Si	ze of Guerrill	a Base in 1940	0 (logged)	
	All	<=400km	<=300km	<=200km	<=100km	Optimal
						Bandwidth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
No RD Polynomial	2.919^{***}	1.672^{***}	1.555^{***}	1.492^{***}	0.929^{***}	0.805^{*}
	(0.168)	(0.212)	(0.228)	(0.249)	(0.315)	(0.447)
Polynomials in Latitude and Longitude						
Linear Polynomial	1.108^{***}	1.721^{***}	1.573^{***}	1.346^{***}	0.931^{***}	0.805^{*}
	(0.252)	(0.305)	(0.309)	(0.315)	(0.355)	(0.447)
Quadratic Polynomial	1.361^{***}	1.439^{***}	1.479^{***}	1.302^{***}	0.975^{***}	0.805*
	(0.297)	(0.327)	(0.332)	(0.337)	(0.363)	(0.447)
Cubic Polynomial	1.132^{***}	1.081^{***}	1.058^{***}	0.982^{***}	0.954^{**}	0.805*
	(0.315)	(0.346)	(0.352)	(0.357)	(0.377)	(0.447)
Quartic Polynomial	1.118^{***}	0.985^{***}	1.152^{***}	1.062^{***}	1.225^{***}	0.805^{*}
	(0.337)	(0.350)	(0.358)	(0.367)	(0.394)	(0.447)
Polynomials in Distance to Boundary						
Linear Polynomial	1.116^{***}	0.779^{**}	0.660^{*}	0.353	0.955^{*}	0.805^{*}
	(0.226)	(0.355)	(0.383)	(0.412)	(0.545)	(0.447)
Quadratic Polynomial	0.581^{*}	0.403	0.632^{*}	0.538	1.094^{*}	0.805^{*}
	(0.299)	(0.363)	(0.380)	(0.427)	(0.568)	(0.447)
Interacted Linear Polynomial	0.416	0.517	0.746^{*}	0.603	1.256^{**}	0.805^{*}
	(0.278)	(0.352)	(0.380)	(0.428)	(0.567)	(0.447)
Segment Fixed Effects	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes
Observations	1708	1035	932	807	540	798
* n<0 10. ** n<0 05. *** n<0 01 Bohnst star	ndard error in r	arentheses Con	stant added hut	not renorted		

	<u> </u>	v	v		1	
			War Perio	d (1937-19	45)	
	All	<=	<=	<=	<=	Optimal
		400km	$300 \mathrm{km}$	$200 \mathrm{km}$	100km	Bandwidth
Panel A	Dens	ity of CCP	Cadre (on	ie in 1,000	population	, logged)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Japanese Occupied Area	0.036^{***}	0.038***	0.036***	0.037^{***}	0.037^{***}	0.024^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Distance to Railway	0.003***	0.005^{***}	0.005^{***}	0.005^{***}	0.007^{***}	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	
Distance to Telegraph	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.001	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
Observations	1708	1035	932	807	540	1708
Panel B	Density o	f CCP Ma	rtyr Soldier	r (one in 1,	000 popula	tion, logged)
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Japanese Occupied Area	0.275***	0.181***	0.166***	0.176***	0.176***	0.165**
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.077)
Distance to Railway	0.027**	0.039**	0.047***	0.050***	0.050***	. ,
	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	
Distance to Telegraph	0.023***	0.032***	0.027**	0.036***	0.022	
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	
Observations	1708	1035	932	807	540	1708
Panel C		Size of	Guerrilla	Base in 194	10 (logged)	
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Japanese Occupied Area	1.467***	1.170***	1.131***	1.200***	1.293***	1.288**
	(0.321)	(0.348)	(0.347)	(0.353)	(0.372)	(0.578)
Distance to Railway	0.197***	0.234***	0.309***	0.362^{***}	0.545^{***}	
	(0.064)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.105)	
Distance to Telegraph	-0.016	0.043	-0.025	0.007	-0.110	
	(0.058)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.105)	
Observations	1709	1035	932	807	540	1712
Cubic Polynomials of XY	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Segments Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 4. Effect of Japanese Army's Occupation on the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party,
Controlling for the Proximity of Railway and Telegraph

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	Η	reaching '	the Yellow River	Dyke as	A Natural	Experiment			
				Waı	Period (1937 - 1945)			
	De	nsity of C	CP Cadre	Density	of CCP N	Martyr Soldier	Size of	Guerrilla	Base in 1940
	(one in]	1,000 popu	ulation, logged)	(one in 1	,000 popu	ulation, logged)		$(\log 6)$	(pa
			Ι	Distance t	o Yellow I	River Flood Area	F		
	 \/	 \/	Optimal	$\overset{ }{\lor}$	 \/	Optimal	 \/	$\overset{ }{\lor}$	Optimal
	$100 \mathrm{km}$	$70 \mathrm{km}$	$\operatorname{Bandwidth}$	$100 \mathrm{km}$	$70 \mathrm{km}$	$\operatorname{Bandwidth}$	$100 \mathrm{km}$	$70 \mathrm{km}$	$\operatorname{Bandwidth}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)
Japanese Occupied Counties	0.012^{*}	0.015^{*}	0.016^{**}	0.174^{**}	0.142^{*}	0.245^{***}	2.112^{**}	2.031^{*}	0.247
	(0.007)	(0.00)	(0.007)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.053)	(0.932)	(1.039)	(0.942)
Flood Area	0.008	0.009		0.023	0.054		-0.430	-0.386	
	(0.009)	(0.009)		(0.078)	(0.072)		(0.805)	(0.881)	
Distance to Railway	-0.000	-0.000		0.072^{***}	0.083^{***}		0.388	0.332	
	(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.022)	(0.022)		(0.289)	(0.344)	
Distance to Telegraph	0.001	0.000		0.004	-0.004		-0.098	-0.151	
	(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.016)	(0.015)		(0.145)	(0.186)	
Cubic Polynomials of XY	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes	Yes
Segments Fixed Effects	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes
Observations	135	102	202	135	102	210	135	102	325
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.0	1. Robust	standard ei	rror in parentheses	s. Constant	t added bu	t not reported.			

Table 5. Effect of Japanese Army's Occupation on the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party,

T.	l'able 6. Fa	usification	Test: Effect of .	apanese (Jccupied .	Area in the Pre-v	var Perioc	_	
				Pre	-war Peri	od $(1921-36)$			
	De	nsity of C	CP Cadre	Density	of CCP]	Martyr Soldier	Size o	f Guerrill	a Base in 1940
	(one in	1,000 popt	ulation, logged)	(one in 1	1,000 pop1	ulation, logged)		$(\log 6)$	(bed)
	All	 \\\	Optimal	All	 \	Optimal	All	 \	Optimal
		$100 \mathrm{km}$	Bandwidth		$100 \mathrm{km}$	$\operatorname{Bandwidth}$		$100 \mathrm{km}$	Bandwidth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)
Japanese Occupied Area	-0.003	-0.000	-0.005	-0.102	-0.118	-0.135	-0.030	-0.010	-0.039
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.093)	(0.098)	(0.127)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Cubic Polynomials of XY	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes
Segment Fixed Effects	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes	${\rm Yes}$	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}
Observations	1708	540	771	1708	540	843	1708	540	854
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<(0.01. Robus	st standard	error in parenthe	ses. Consta	ant added	but not reported.			

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Ta	able 7. Alter	native Exp	lanations of	of the Pre-w	var Rise of	the Chin	ese Commur	nist Party		
	Dummy	Number	Number	\mathbf{Share}	\mathbf{Share}	Land	Number	Number	Number	Number
	of	of	of	of	of	Tax	of	of	of	of
	Treaty	Modern	Primary	Unionized	Tenancy	Per	Strong	\mathbf{Secret}	Conflicts	Tongmenghui
	Ports	Firms	and	Workers	(1934)	Capita	Clans	Societies	in	Member
		(1840 -	Middle			(1934)	(with	(Qing)	Qing	
		1937)	Schools				Genealogie	s)	Dynasty	
			(1937)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)	(10)
Japanese Occupied Area	-0.125	0.058	0.026	-0.011	0.064	-0.034	-0.078	0.058	0.004	-0.043
	(0.215)	(0.208)	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.212)	(0.201)	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.011)	(0.081)
Cubic Polynomials of XY	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes	Yes
Segment Fixed Effects	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes
Number of Observations	1708	1708	1708	1708	1528	1433	1708	1708	1708	1708
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<	<0.01. Robust	standard e	rror in pare	ntheses. Cor	nstant adde	d but not	reported.			

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				M	ar Period	(1937-45)			
	Dei	nsity of CO	CP Cadre	Density	of CCP N	Aartyr Soldier	Size of	f Guerrill	a Base in 1940
	(one in 1	,000 popu	ilation, logged)	(one in 1.	,000 popu	ulation, logged)		$(\log_{E}$	(bed)
	All		Optimal	All		Optimal	All		Optimal
		$100 \mathrm{km}$	$\operatorname{Bandwidth}$		$100 \mathrm{km}$	$\operatorname{Bandwidth}$		$100 \mathrm{km}$	$\operatorname{Bandwidth}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)
apanese Army (β_0)	0.011	0.012	0.009	0.299^{***}	0.103^{**}	0.193^{***}	0.101^{**}	0.094	0.096
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.066)
uppet Troops (β_1)	0.040^{***}	0.043***	0.034^{***}	0.563^{***}	0.310^{***}	0.313^{***}	0.427^{***}	0.411^{***}	0.473^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.00)	(0.065)	(0.097)	(0.083)	(0.144)	(0.133)	(0.146)
$1 - \beta_0$	0.029^{***}	0.031^{***}	0.025^{*}	0.264^{***}	0.207^{**}	0.121^{**}	0.326^{**}	0.317^{**}	0.377^{***}
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.077)	(0.097)	(0.060)	(0.165)	(0.144)	(0.133)
¹ ubic Polynomials of XY	${ m Yes}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}
egment Fixed Effects	${ m Yes}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}
fumber of Observations	1708	540	721	1708	540	694	1708	540	858

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		Table	9. Grassroot	s Party Or	ganizatio	n as Channel				1
					War Peri	od $(1940-45)$				I.
	Count	y Party Co	ommittee	Durati	on of Cou	nty Party		Rank	of Party	
		(=1)			Committ	ee		0rga	nization	
	All		Optimal	All		Optimal	All	 \	Optimal	1
		$100 \mathrm{km}$	Bandwidth		$100 \mathrm{km}$	$\operatorname{Bandwidth}$		$100 \mathrm{km}$	Bandwidth	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)	
Japanese Occupied Area	0.437^{***}	0.318^{***}	0.520^{***}	1.435^{***}	0.813^{***}	0.930^{***}	0.163^{***}	0.148^{***}	0.138^{**}	I
	(0.102)	(0.064)	(0.165)	(0.361)	(0.102)	(0.216)	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.068)	
Cubic Polynomials of XY	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	1
Segment Fixed Effects	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	
Number of Observations	1708	540	844	1708	540	684	1708	540	714	
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<	0.01. Robus	t standard	error in parent	heses. Con	stant adde	d but not repor	ted.			1

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		TADIE IU. WE				
	All	<=100km	Optimal	All	<=100km	Optimal
			Bandwidth			Bandwidth
			War Pe	riod (1937-1945)		
Panel A		Density of Civilians	s Killed		Massacre $(=$	=1)
	(one	e in 1,000 populatie	on, logged)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(0)
Japanese Occupied Area	0.881^{***}	0.740^{***}	0.429^{**}	1.014^{***}	1.089^{***}	0.944^{***}
	(0.143)	(0.165)	(0.206)	(0.079)	(0.106)	(0.068)
Observations	1708	540	852	1708	540	769
Panel B		Density of Rape	Cases		omfort Women Ce	enter (=1)
	(one	e in 1,000 populatie	on, logged)			
	(2)	(8)	(6)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Japanese Occupied Area	0.261^{***}	0.349^{***}	0.338^{***}	2.575^{**}	2.009^{**}	1.146^{***}
	(0.092)	(0.111)	(0.115)	(1.222)	(1.010)	(0.205)
Observations	1709	540	834	1708	540	813
Cubic Polynomials of XY	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Segment Fixed Effects	γ_{es}	$\mathbf{V}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\gamma_{ m es}$	γ_{es}	Y_{es}	γ_{es}

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			All	Samples		
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		towards	Import	Sushi	``Chinese	Central
		Japan	from Japan	$\operatorname{Restaurants}$	${ m Dream}$	Government
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Japanese Occupied Area	0.312^{***}	-0.295^{***}	-0.056^{***}	-0.183^{**}	0.450^{***}	0.322^{***}
	(0.069)	(0.106)	(0.012)	(0.092)	(0.078)	(0.097)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic Polynomials of XY	\mathbf{Yes}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	215642	3457	326	326	326	4217
All regressions include cubic RI) polynomial in latit	ude and longitude	and control for per c	apita GDP, size of p	opulation, per cap	ita fiscal expenditure,
per capita FDI, years of school	ing in 2010, revolutio	onary county, ethn	ic minority county,	and poverty county.	Robust standard	errors in parentheses;
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.	01; Constant terms a	are not reported.				

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Table 11.	

Appendix (For Online Publication)

Appendix A. Additional Table

			<=	=100km		
	Dens	ity of CCP	Cadre (or	e in 1,000	population	, logged)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
JOA 1938	0.012					-0.011
	(0.014)					(0.012)
JOA 1939		0.027^{***}				0.004
		(0.007)				(0.012)
JOA 1940			0.042^{***}			0.041^{***}
			(0.010)			(0.014)
JOA 1941				0.033***		-0.002
				(0.010)		(0.005)
JOA 1942				. ,	0.041**	0.042***
					(0.016)	(0.013)
Distance to Railway	0.006**	0.007^{**}	0.008***	0.007^{**}	0.005*	0.007**
, i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Distance to Telegraph	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Observations	540	540	540	540	540	540
	Density o	of CCP Ma	rtyr Soldie	r (one in 1	,000 popula	ation, logged)
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
JOA 1938	0.118					-0.024
	(0.090)					(0.096)
JOA 1939		0.191***				0.037
		(0.051)				(0.070)
JOA 1940			0.201***			0.118^{*}
			(0.049)			(0.064)
JOA 1941				0.239^{***}		0.141**
				(0.047)		(0.057)
JOA 1942					0.288^{***}	0.212**
					(0.095)	(0.105)
Distance to Railway	0.048^{***}	0.053^{***}	0.058^{***}	0.053^{***}	0.042***	0.052***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Distance to Telegraph	0.014	0.016	0.021	0.020	0.018	0.024*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Observations	540	540	540	540	540	540
Cubic Polynomials of XY	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Segments Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A1. Effect of Japanese Army's Occupation on the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party,Occupied Area Boundaries between 1939 and 1942

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses. Constant added but not reported.

Appendix B. Additional Maps



Figure A1. Routes of Long March, 1934-35

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_March



Figure A2. Illustrative Maps of Japanese Wartime Intelligence



Figure A3. China's Provincial Administrative Boundaries Overlain by the Japanese Occupied Area in 1940



Figure A4. Spatial Distribution of Population and Industrial Workers in 1930s China

Appendix C. Questions of China Political Compass Survey

The China Political Compass Survey contains 50 questions. The ordering of these questions is randomized for each respondent who takes the survey. We select and classify those questions related to beliefs in nationalism. Respondents are asked to rate their agreement from "most agreeable" to "most disagreeable" on a five-point Likert scale on following statements:

1) "National unification and territorial unity are of the highest interest to a society." "国家的统一和领土完整是社会的最高利益。"

2) "As long as it is allowed by state capacity, China has the right to take any action to defend its national interests." "如果国家综合实力许可,那么中国有权为了维护自己的利益而采取任何行动。"

3) "Military force should be applied to unify Taiwan should conditions permit." "条件许可的话应当武力统一台湾。"

4) "It is unrealistic to expect the Western hegemon led by the United States to truly tolerate China's rise to become a major power." "以美国为首的西方国家不可能真正容许中国崛起 成为一流强国。"

5) "The state should take measures to groom and support athletes to compete in various international competitions for national glory." "国家应当采取措施培养和支持体育健儿在 各种国际比赛场合为国争光。"